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INTERESTS CREATED BY GRANTS OF COAL APART FROM THE SURFACE
When coal, owned separately from the surface, is removed from its
bed, who owns the hole that is left? Or, to put the question in differ-
ent form, what is the nature and extent of the interest created by the
unqualified grant or reservation of all the coal under a given tract of
land? For many years it has been held both in England and this coun-
try, that such a conveyance or reservation operates to sever the land
horizontally, creating independent estates in the surface and subjacent
layers: Estates in coal lands so created have been treated exactly as
similar estates in other kinds of land.2  Property in minerals is taxed
like any other real property.3 While conveyance of such property by
'Duke of Hamilton v. Graham (1871, H. L.) L. R. 2 Sc. App. Cas. 166; Wester-
nan, v. Penn. Salt Mfg. Co. (1918) 26o Pa. 140, 103 Atl. 539; 3 Lindley, Mines
(3d ed. 1914) sec. 812; MacSwinney, Mines (3d ed. 19o7) 42; I Tiffany, Real
Property (192o ed.) 867.
- Kinder v. La Salle County Coal Co. (1921, Ili.) 133 N. E. 772. A widow is
entitled to dower in minerals of which her deceased husband was seised apart
from the surface. Stoughton v. Leigh (i8o8, K. B.) I Taunt 402.
' Graciosa Oil Co. v. Santa Barbara (igog) 155"Calif. i4O, 99 Pac. 483; Con-
solidated Coal Co. v. Baker (1891) 135 Ill. 545, 26 N. E. -5I.
[747]
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livery of seisin at common law might have been difficult,' that difficulty
would not be experienced in reserving or, more accurately, excepting
such interests,- or in making conveyances under the Statute of Uses."
Thus they can now be transmitted by deed, devise, or inheritance
exactly as other real property. Title to minerals may be lost or
acquired by adverse possession, but -such possession must be actual and
not merely constructive. 8 Before severance, the person in possession
of the surface is constructively in possession of the minerals beneath,
but not so after severanceY It would seem necessarily to follow that
the owner of the subjacent layer of land is privileged to make such use
of his land as he sees fit, assuming always that he does not fail in his
duty to provide adequate subjacent support to the surface 0 ; and, con-
sequently, that he can use tunnels and galleries cut within and through
his subterranean holdings as haulways for minerals severed from adja-
cent lands of his own, or even of another. And such has been the hold-
ing of the courts 1 with only slight signs of wavering, 2 until the decis-
ion of Clayborn v. Camilla Red Ash Coal Co.' 3
Many courts, however, by a curious and seemingly unnecessary
implication, declare all estates in fee in underlying lands to be termina-
ble upon exhaustion of the minerals. 1" After the minerals have been
' Caldwell v. Fulton (1858) 31 Pa. 475; Marble Co. v. Ripley (187o, U. S.) Io
Wall. 339.
'Batten Pool v. Kennedy [19o7] I Ch. 256; Whitaker v. Brown (1863) 46
Pa. 197.
'Lee v. Bumgardner (1889) 86 Va. 315, io S. E. 3.
T Kinder v. La Salle County Coal Co., supra note 2.
'Renfro v. Hanon (1921) 297 Ill. 353, 13o N. E. 74o; Armstrong v. Caldwell
(1866) 53 Pa. 284; Gill v. Fletcher (39o6) 74 Ohio St. 295, 78 N. E. 433.
'Pardee v. Murray (882) 4 Mont. 234, 2 Pac. 16; Armstrong v. Caldwel,
supra note 8; Scott v. Laws (gig) 185 Ky. 440, 215 S. W. 81. But if a
disseisor grants minerals, his continued adverse possession of the surface inures
to the benefit of the grantee as against the disseisee. McBurney v. Glenmary
Coal & Coke Co. (19o9) 121 Tenn. 275, 118 S. W. 694.
'0 Attebery v. Blair (1910) 244 Ill. 363, 91 N. E. 475.
"Proud v. Bates (1865) 34 L. J. Ch. 4o6; Duke of Hamilton v. Graham, supra
note I; Batten Pool v. Kennedy, supra note 5; Lillibridge v. Lackawanna Coal
Co. (1891) 143 Pa. 293, 22 At. 1035; Wesierma n v. Penn. Salt Mfg. Co., supra
note i; Attebery v. Blair, supra.note io; Madison v. Garfield Coal Co.'(19oi)
114 Iowa, 56, 86 N. W. 4r; Lindley, op. cit. sec. 813a; MacSwinney, op. cit. 79.
" See dicta in Chartiers Block Coal Co. v. Mellon (1893) 152 Pa. 286, 25 AUt.
597; Webber it. Vogel (1893) 159 Pa. 235, 28 Ati. 226; Ramsay v. Blair (1876,
H. L.) L. R. I App. Cas. 701; and opinion of Lord Chelmsford in Duke of
Hamilton v. Graham, supra note i, at pp. 171, 172, 175, 176. Cases involving min-
ing operations under Crown Manor copyhold lands are governed by a different
rule, since all minerals under such lands belong, to the Crown. The rights of
the Crown cease immediately upon the removal of the coal. See Eardley v.
Granville (1876) L. R. 3 Ch. Div. 826; Bowser v. Maclean (i86o, Ch.) 2 De
G. F. & J. 415.
' (I920) 128 Va. 383, 105 S. E. 117.
"Chartiers Block 'Coal Co. v. Mellon, supra note 12; Webber i. Vogel (1899)
189 Pa. 156, 42 At. 4; McBurney v. Glenmary Coal and Coke Co., supra note 9.
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wholly removed, title to the underground space revests, it is said, not in
the original grantor, but in the owner of the surface. 15 The alleged
lack of endurance on the part of these fees in underlying sections of min-
eral land seemed to the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, in the inter-
esting case just mentioned, so greatly "at variance with fundamental
legal principles" that it felt constrained to repudiate them altogether and
to enjoin the defendant, the grantee of "all the coal on, in or under" the
land of the complainant, from transporting coal mined under defend-
ant's adjacent tract, forming part of the same coal field, through a tun-
nel which had been formed by the mining operations under the com-
plainant's land. The coal under complainant's land had not yet been
exhausted, but the headway in the tunnel had been heightened by cut-
ting away a small portion of the basic stratum of rock. The court
holds that the "conveyance carries the estate in the coal only, with
the necessary incidental easement to use the containing walls for sup-
port, and for the purpose of getting it out," and thinks that the reverter
upon exhaustion is to be explained only by assuming that the grantee
never took any "corporeal estate" in the walls containing or the space
occupied by the coal. It does not experience any of the difficulty so
strongly stated by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 6 in conceiv-
ing of ownership of coal as "a corporeal hereditament" independently
of the space it occupies.
It is believed that none of the numerous cases which have declared that
estates in subjacent mineral land when severed from the surface, ter-
minate ipso facto upon exhaustion of the minerals, put that question in
issue.'7  Instead of saying that upon exhaustion of the coal the grantee's
estate reverts to the owner of the surface (not to the grantor, or his heirs,
be it noted), it would seem more reasonable to say that when the owner
of a worked-out mine has unequivocally abandoned it, the surface own-
er's possession of the abandoned subterranean spaces is re-established,
and ripens into title after the statutory period has expired.18 But even
'= See cases cited supra note 14 and infra note 17.
'"How could the defendant own the coal absolutely and in fee simple, and not
own the space it occupied? Or how is it possible to conceive of such a thing as
the ownership of the space independently of the coal?" Lillibridge v. Lacka-
wanna Coal Co., supra note II.
"The statement appears first to have been made in Lillibridge v. Lackawanna
Coal Co., supra note ii, in which the interest conveyed was expressly determin-
able upon the exhaustion of the coal. But in that case the court states that in
Whitaker v. Brown, supra note 5, the grantor had excepted "an entire and
perpetual property" in the coal. In Schobert v. Pittsburgh Coal & Mining Co.
(1912) 254 Ill. 474, 98 N. E. 945, the grant was likewise expressly limited to
terminate when all the coal was removed. In neither of the Webber v. Vogel
cases [(1893) 159 Pa. 235, 28 Atl. 226, (I899) I89 Pa. i56, 42 Ati. 4] was the
terminable character of the fee involved, but the latter contains a vigorous dictum
on the point.
I" In Westerman v. Penn. Salt Mfg. Co., supra note i, the court said: "The
deed vested in the defendant a corporeal estate in fee in the coal; and until that
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if it be assumed that this dictum, by a process of reiteration, has become
a rule of law, it seems difficult to follow the Virginia court in its con-
clusion that since the interest of the coal owner ceases upon exhaustion
of the coal, it cannot be an estate in that portion of the land that con-
tains the coal. Real interests which may, by express provision or by
implication, come to an end upon some future contingency, are by no
means unknown, or even rare, in our law.19 Tenants of such qualified
estates have, prior to the happening of such contingency, all the rights
and privileges they would have enjoyed had the estates been absolute.2 0
Theref ore the view .of the Supreme Court of West Virginia as expressed
in Arnstrong v. Maryland Coal Co.,21 that, under the alleged rule, the
owner of an estate in subjacent land could extend his tenancy indefin-
itely by leaving some portion of the coal unmined, and that, "if need be
a few pillars could be left for subjacent support, which would answer all
requirements," is quite consistent with the nature of the base fee
assumed to exist.
Interests granted or reserved in coal separate from the surface fall
roughly into three classes. The first consists of mere licenses or priv-
ileges to enter upon the land and explore for coal, usually coupled with
a collateral agreement for the sale to the licensee of such coal as may
be severed and removed.2 2 The second includes profits I prendre in
coal lands. The grantee of a profit is given the right, as well as the
privilege, to go upon the land and sever coal therefrom, and the power
by severance to acquire title-to the coal removed.2 3  In the third class
are corporeal interests in that portion of the land containing the coal.
They are created by those grants which operate to sever the land into
horizontal layers and convey to the purchaser of the coal that layer
which includes the coal.
24
The character of the interest transferred in any particular transac-
tion depends not upon the name given to the contract, for mining con-
estate is terminated by the exhaustion of the coal, or lost by abandonment, the
vendee is entitled to the possession of the coal, and also of the space made by its
removal, and may use such space in transporting coal from other lands."
Coke, Littleton, 13b; Church of Latter Day Saints v. United States (1889)
136 U. S. I, IO Sup. Ct. 792; First Universalist Soc. v. Bolland (1892) 155 Mass.
171, 29 N. E. 524; I Tiffany, op. cit. 334.
Walsinghanms Case (573, Exch.) Plowd. 552, 557; Challis, Real Property
(3d ed. 1911) 262.
(igio) 67 W. Va. 589, 6o8, 69 S. E. z95, 203.
=See Doe v. Wood (i8ig, K. B.) 2 Barn. & Aid. 724, 739; In re Haven Gold
Mining Co. (1882, C. A.) L. M 20 Ch. Div. 151; 2o Hals. Laws Eng. 568; Silsby
v. Trotter (1878) 29 N. J. Eq. 228; Young v. Ellis (1895) 91 Va. 297, 21 S. E.
480. A mere license, it seems, may be lost by non-user. Scott v. Laws, supra
note 9.
'Sutherland v. Heathcote [1892] 1 Ch. 475, 483; Caldwell v. Fulton (1858) 31
Pa. 475; Grubb v. Bayard (851, C. C. 3d) 2 Wall. Jr. 81, Fed. Cas. No. 5849.
21 Scott v. Laws, supra note 9; Moore v. Indian Camp Coal Co. (9o7) 75 Ohio
St. 493, 8o N. E. 6. The owner in fee may in fact grant as many separate strata
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tracts are fearfully and wonderfully made, and bear strange names,
but upon the intention of the parties as expressed in the instrument
executed.2 5  This intention is not always easy of determination.
Especially is it difficult in some cases to decide whether the parties
intend to create an "incorporeal" profit or a "corporeal" estate in the
land itself. 26  Yet once it is decided, the resulting rights of the parties
are very different. The owner of a corporeal estate takes title to
the coal in the bed, with the exclusive right of possession of the
space which it occupies 27 ; while the owner of a profit takes no title to
the coal in situ, but only the power to acquire title by severing it from
land, when it becomes personalty. 28 Therefore, he never owns the coal
as real estate. It follows that the owner of a profit cannot recover in
trover the value of coal wrongfully severed, for he never had title or
possession. His remedy is in trespass for damage done to his profit.2?
So, unless by the terms of his grant the profit is expressly made exclu-
sive, he cannot prevent his grantor, or some one holding under him,
from taking coal from the same tract.3 0  The rights of the purchaser
of a profit in coal lands are analogous to those of the purchaser of
standing timber, who, if his contract is in proper form, gets an incor-
poreal interest in the land, but, it seem on principle, no title to the trees
until they are severed.
31
as he pleases, just as the owner of a many-storied apartment house might grant
separately as many different floors as he might wish. The grantee of each
stratum would have a way of necessity through the overlying strata. Chartiers
Block Coal Co. v. Mellon, supra note 12.
" Gill v. Fletcher, supra note 8; Transcontinental Oil Co. v. Emmerson (1921)
298 Il1. 394, 131 N. E. 645.
"The grant of a right to dig and carry away coal confers but a profit. Grubb
v. Bayard, supra note 23; but a grant of an unrestricted right to remove all the
coal under a certain tract conveys a corporeal estate in the land itself. Caldwell
v. Fulton, suprai note 23. A "mining lease" may properly be construed as a grant
of the minerals themselves, together with such easements, express or implied, as
may be necessary for their removal: States Oil Corp. v. Ward (1922, Tex. Com.
App.) 236 S. W. 446; Texas Co. v. Daugherty (1915) io7 Tex. 26, 176 S. W.
717; or it may give only "a bare right or privilege to go upon the land and mine
for such minerals and reduce them to possession." Oil & Pipe Line Co. v. Teel
(1902) 95 Tex. 586, 68 S. W. 979; Leonard'v. Caruthers (1921, Tex. Civ. App.)
236 S. W. 189.
' Moore v. Indian Camp Coal Co., supra note 24.
' Tiley v. Moyers (1862) 43 Pa. 404; Kelly v. Keys (i9o6) 213 Pa. 295, 62 Atl.
911; Austin v. Huntsville Coal Co. (i88o) 72 Mo. 535.
'Baker v. Hart (i8go) 123 N. Y. 470, 25 N. E. 948; Chetham v. Williamson
(I8O4, K. B.) 4 East, 469.
'Mountjoy's Case (1583) reported in Coke, Littleton, 164 b; Stockbridge Iron
Co. v. Hudson Iron Co. (1871) 1o7 Mass. 29o. The intention to make a profit
exclusive must be clearly expressed. Even a grant of a right to enter and dig
"all the ore" is not sufficient. Grubb v. Bayard, supra note 23.
" See Ives v. Sams (1596) Cro. Eliz. 521; Clap v. Draper (8o8) 4 Mass. 265;
Williams v. Triche (I9O2) IO7 La. 92, 31 So. 926; Board of Supervisors v.
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On the other hand, the grantee of a corporeal estate in the coal-bear-
ing stratum, as shown above, has all the rights, privileges, and duties of
the. owner of any other land so long as his estate endures, and on
account of the peculiar location of his land, has the added right of using
the surface so far as necessary to gain access to his underlying land, and
also the added duty of subjacent support of the surface.
3 2
However difficult may be the construction of coal grants in some
cases, the meaning of the language used in the Clayborn case,33 "all the
coal on, in or under" the land described, admits of no doubt. For
nearly a hundred years courts both in England and America have con-
strued such a grant as conveying a fee simple in the 'coal-bearing
layer34 ; and this horizontal section includes not only the actual coal, but
also by necessary intendment, slate or rock lying in or between seams,
or above or .below them, which must be removed in order to make
effective the grant of the coal.35 But in spite of the clear teaching of
the precedents, the Virginia court so construes this grant as to create a
new kind of real interest, the like of which the writer can discover
nowhere else in the law ;36 that is, the ownership of a portion of the
Imperial Naval Stores Co. (19o8) 93 Miss. 822, 47 So. 177; Young v. Camp Mfg.
Co. (191o) i1O Va. 678, 66.S. E. 843; Tiffany, op. cit. sec. 261; 13 Cyc. 651, 679;
and see (1922) 31 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 328; NoTEs (1904) 17 HAv. L. REv. 411;
(1914) 28"ibid. II4. Yellow Poplar Co. v. Thompson's Heirs (iqo8) lo8 Va. 612,
62 S. E. 358, seems contra.
"Morris v. Salina County Coal Co. (1918) 211 Ill. App. 178; Penmal; v. Jones
(1917) 256 Pa. 416, Ioo Atl. 1043 (see criticism of this case by Professor Holifeld.
Faulty Analysis in Easement and License Cases (1917) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL,
66). The unrestricted grant of minerals does not negative the grantor's right
to subjacent support. Hall v. Harvey Coal & Coke Co. (1921, W. Va.) io8
S. E. 491.
3Supra note 13.
" Cardigan v. Arinitage (1823, K. B.) 2 Barn. & Cress. 197; Caldwell v'. Fultom)
(1858) 31 Pa. 475; Lindley, op. cit. sec. 812.
'Moore v. Indian Camp Coal Co., supra note 24; Duke of Hamilton v. Graham,
supra note I.
' Extrajudicial observations are occasionally met with going the full length of
the decision in the Clayborn case, supra note 13. Thus in Chartiers Block Coal
Co. v. Mellon, supra note 12, the court says: "The position that the owner of the
coal is also the owner of the hole from which it has been removed .... has no
authority in reason, nor do I think, in law." So in McBurney v. Glenmary Coal
and Coke Co., supra note 9, the court, after stating that a corporeal interest in
land passed, describes it as follows: "It is in reality 'simply a right to enter and
go upon the land, and take therefrom the particular mineral conveyed, and when
that is done the right is exhausted." (at p. 296.) This is but a definition of a
profit 6 prendre; and such is the estate that the court in the Clayborn case seems
to have had in mind, despite its declaration that the coal owner's interest was
corporeal. This inference is strengthened by the court's reference (at p. 392) to
the interest of the grantee of standing timber as similar to that of the grantee
of minerals. It is submitted that, despite the confusing decisions and the many
careless statements that seem to regard the interest granted in standing trees
as corporeal, it is, while realty, incorporeal realty. The grantee gets a right to
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earth's substance in one person, while the ownership of the space occu-
pied by that substance is in another. Appendant to this peculiar "cor-
poreal hereditament" is a sort of easement in the space occupied by the
coal and in the containing walls for the purpose of enabling the owner
to sever and remove his coal, but the easement is strictly limited to this
user. It necessarily follows that the space left in tunnels and galleries
from* which coal has been removed cannot be used for hauling coal
from other lands to the pit mouth, without the consent of the surface
owner, to whom it belongs. This is quite a different conception from
that of the House of Lords in Duke of Hamilton v. Graham," where,
referring to the coal owner's claim of a haulage way, it is said: "He
is carrying them through his own property, and not the property of
the Pursuer at all."
This anomalous real estate created by the Virginia court, being
neither profit nor land, is manifestly obnoxious to that canon of com-
mon sense and common law that discourages the creation of new and
unusual estates in land,38 which are already sufficiently numerous and
complex. It is even more obnoxious, as shown in the dissenting opin-
ion of Mr. Justice Prentis, to that principle of economics that requires
rules of law to be so framed as to facilitate and not obstruct industry
and production. That it is usually expedient and often necessary that
a coal field, lying under many separate tracts, shall be mined as a unit
operation, is so well known .that courts have taken note of it in con-
struing grants of mining rights.39 In rough and mountainous regions,
such as contain the Appalachian coal fields, where a seam is often
exposed to view on the side of a great mountain only to plunge inwards
far below its mass, it must frequently occur that the entire seam must
be worked from a single drift mouth. To require that each separate
mineral tract shall be worked independently, with right of access only
through the surface of such tract, would impose upon the industry a
burden that would seem both unnecessary and unreasonable.40
go upon the land and sever the trees, and the power by so doing to acquire title
to the timber severed. Such a right is a profit. See cases cited supra note 31 ;
see also Young v. Camp Mfg. Co. (191o) 11o Va. 678, 66 S. E. 843; Smith v.
Ramsey (1914) iI6 Va. 530, 82 S. E. 189; Beatty v. Mathewson (i9o8) 40 Can.
Sup. Ct. 557. Somewhat analogous to the spaceless body said to be granted in
the Clayborn case was the bodiless space held in Hahn v. Baker Lodge (1891) 21
Or. 30, 27 Pac. 166, to pass to the grantee of a "hall" on the second floor of a
building. The conveyance gave to -the grantee no interest in the building itself,
not even in the walls containing the "hall," but merely in the space enclosed.
Hence when the space ceased to be defined by reason of the destruction by fire
of the containing walls, it ceased to exist as a "hall" and the grantee's property
right was at an end.
' Supra note i, at p. 181.
' Hill v. Tupper (1863, Exch.) 2 Hurl. & Colt. 120.
'Sherwood v. Greater Monmouth Vein Coal Co. (1921, Iowa) 185 N. W. 279.
" Provisions in conveyances and leases of mineral rights will be construed
liberally in aid of economic operation. See Genett v. D. & H. Canal Co. (89o)
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An underground way of access to adjacent coal is much more con-
venient for the coal owner and much less burdensome to the sur-
face owner than a right of way over the surface and hence more bene-
ficial to the public. It is quite possible for the grantor by express pro-
vision so to restrict the use of the haulways that only coal from the
granted tract may be transported through them,41 but no such intent
should be presumed.4 2
W. R. V.
VALIDITY OF THE NINETEENTH AMENDMENT
The Supreme Court in Leser v. Garnett (1922) 42 Sup. Ct. 217,
affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals of Maryland sustaining
the validity of the Nineteenth Amendment.1 The opinion considers
briefly and holds untenable the various objections raised. While there
is no fault to find with the result of the decision-it could not indeed
have been otherwise-some of the issues involved are of permanent
interest and perhaps merit a somewhat fuller discussion than was given
by the court.
The first contention, that "so great an addition to the electorate, if
made without the state's consent, destroys its autonomy as a political
body" and thus deprives the state of equal representation.in the Senate,
was disposed of by a reference to the Fifteenth Amendment. The court
refused to entertain the suggested distinction that the Fifteenth Amend-
ment, while not adopted in accordance with law, has been validated
merely by acquiescence.
2
The second contention, that the state Constitutions of Tennessee and
Missouri3 contain provisions limiting the power of the legislature to
ratify, was disposed of in the same summary fashion.
"The function of a state Legislature in ratifying a proposed amend-
ment to the federal Constitution, like the function of Congress in pro-
posing the amendment, is a federal function derived from the federal
122 N. Y. 505, 25'N. E. 922; McCracken v. Gumbert (189o) 131 Pa. 36, 18 Atl.
io68; St. Louis Trust Co. v. Galloway Coal Co. (1913, C. C. A. 5th) 201 Fed.
1022.
Schobert v. Pittsburgh Coal & Min. Co., supra note 17.
'Pruett v. O'Gara Coal Co. (1911) 165 Ill. App. 470. No easement of access
through the surface will be implied when the coal owner has access by tunnel
from adjacent land. Friedline v. Hoffman (1922, Pa.) 115 Atl. 845.
1 (1921) 114 Atl. 840.
'See Machen, Is the Fifteenth Amendment Void. (1909) 23 HA v. L. REv.
169; Marbury, The Limitations upon the Amending Power (1919) 33 HARv. L.
REv. 223; Frierson, Amending the Constitution of the United States; A Reply
to Mr. Marbury (1920) 33 HARV. L. REv. 659.
"No convention or general assembly of this state shall act upon any amend-
ment of the Constitution of the United States proposed by Congress to the several
states, unless such convention or general assembly shall have been elected after
such amendment is submitted." Tenn. Const. 187o, art, 2, sec. 32. A similar
provision is found in the Florida Constitution. 1885, art. 16, sec. i. Florida
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Constitution; and it transcends any limitations sought to be imposed
by the people of a state."
4
But does this not disregard the important principle of the sovereignty
of the people, upon which our government is based,
5 and is it not logi-
cally inconsistent with the principle that the state legislatures, being
creatures of the state constitutions, must act in subordination thereto
since they cannot be greater than their creators?' A decision of this
point was unnecessary in the present case, as will hereafter appear, but
in view of the fact that the question may arise again and be squarely
presented for determination, it may not be inappropriate to suggest that
the court's statement that any limitations sought to be imposed by the
people 6f the state are void, is perhaps too broad. Is there, for example,
any inconsistency in the federal requirement that ratification shall be by
state legislatures, and the Tennessee requirement that ratification shall
be, so far as Tennessee is concerned, by a legislature elected after the
proposal of the amendment? It is regrettable that the court dismissed
the contention so briefly, without examining the issues involved or giving
some idea of the reasons upon which its conclusion was reached.
What part of their inherent sovereignty did the people of the states
intend to part with under Article V of the Federal Constitution ?T In
the Ohio referendum case of Hawke v. Smith the court said :s
did not act upon the Amendment. The Missouri Constitution provides that "the
legislature is not authorized to adopt nor will the people of the state ever assent
to any amendment or change of the Constitution of the United States which may
in any wise impair the right of local self-government belonging to the people of
the state." Mo. Const. 1875, art. 2, sec. 3.
'Citing Hawke v. Smith, No. I (1920) 253 U. S. 221, 40 Sup. Ct. 495; Hawke
v. Smith, No. 2 (1920) 253 U. S. 231, 40 Sup. Ct. 498; National Prohibition Cases
(1920) 253 U. S. 350, 386, 40 Sup. Ct 486, 488. (Italics ours.) See also Dodd,
Amending the Constitution (192o) 30 YALE LA-w JoURNAL, 321, 344.
'"The fabric of American empire ought to rest in the solid basis of the consent
of the people. The streams of national power ought to flow immediately from
that pure original foundation of all legitimate authority." Alexander Hamilton,
THE FEDERALIST (1788) No. XXII. See also McCulloch v. Maryland (isig,
U. S.) 4 Wheat. 316, 4o3. Likewise it is essential that the amendments to the
Constitution rest on that same foundation. See Dillon v. Gloss (1921) 256 U. S.
368, 374, 41 Sup. Ct. 510, 512.
'Watson, The Cowstitution (igio) 1341.
"The Congress, whenever two-thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary,
shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the application of the
Legislatures of two-thirds of the several States, shall call a convention for pro-
posing Amendments which, in either case, shall be valid to all intents and
purposes, as part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three-
fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three-fourths thereof, as the
one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed by Congress; provided
that no Amendment which may be made prior to the year One Thousand Eight
Hundred and Eight shall in any manner affect the first and fourth clauses in the
Ninth Section of the First Article and that no State, without its consent, shall
be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate."
' (1920) 253 U. S. 221, 226, 4o Sup. Ct. 495, 497, reversing Hawke v. Smith
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"The method of ratification is left to Congress. Both methods, by
legislatures or conventions, call for action by deliberative assemblages
representative of the people, which it was assumed would voice the will
of the people."
And again :9
"Any other view might lead to endless confusion in the manner of
ratificationof federal amendments. The choice of the means of ratifi-
cation was wisely withheld from conflicting action in the several states."
It seems to be recognized in that case that the purpose of Article V
was to authorize Congress to assign the function of ratifying to state
legislatures or conventions as it might see fit in order to bring about
uniformity in the -mode of ratification but not to take from the people
their legitimate control over these agencies. It is quite true that a state
legislature derives its power of ratification from the Federal Constitu-
tion, and thus is exercising a "federal function ;" but it does not follow
that the legislature is thereby invested with the sovereignty which is
inherent in the people. When a legislature fails or refuses to consider
a proposed amendment, the Federal Government has no ground for
complaint. And if the people of the state, who are responsible for the
existence of that legislature and whose will, as expressed in the state
constitution, that legislature may not transcend, forbid it to act at all
or authorize it to act only upon certain conditions, it is difficult to see
upon what logical ground any validity can be given to a "ratification"
in disregard of such commands.
That a state legislature, although acting in pursuance of an authority
granted by the United States, cannot act in violation of the state consti-
tution in which the limitations upon its powers are fixed, was recognized
by the Supreme Court in the case of Haire v. Rice' 0  The court dis-
tinctly held that Congress, in designating a state legislature as an agency
for carrying out a federal purpose, "intended such a legislature as would
be established by the Constitution of the State, .... .a legislature
whose powers were certain to be limited by organic law .... a legis-
lature as a parliamentary body, acting within its lawful powers, and
(1919) ioo Ohio St. 385, 126 N. E. 4oo. (Italics ours.) The state court had
held that the referendum was part of the state "legislature" and hence applicable
to the federal amending process. See to the same effect State v. Howell (igrg)
io8 Wash. 340, i8i Pac. 920, holding that the word "legislature" refers to the
legislative power of the state however expressed. The Supreme Court gave to
the word "legislature" its ordinary meaning and properly held that since the
Federal Constitution prescribes the method by which amendments shall be made,
a state constitution cannot change that method. See also William H. Taft, Can
Ratification of an Amendment to the Constitution be Made to Depend Upon a
Referendum? (1920) 29 YAIE LAW jouRxAL, 821.
'253 U. S. 221, 230, 40 Sup'. Ct. 495, 498. (Italics ours.)"0 (1907) 204 U. S. 291, 27 Sup. Ct. :28i.
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by parliamentary methods." "It follows, therefore, that in executing
the authority entrusted to it by Congress, the legislature must act in.
subordination to the state constitution."
It is a reasonable conclusion, then, that a state legislature, when desig-
nated by Congress as the agency for passing upon a proposed amend-
ment, acts as the agent, not of the 'Federal Government, but of the
people of the state, upon whose will depends its very existence; and that
when such a body assumes to act in direct violation of the commands of
the people, as expressed in the state constitution, its action has no more
binding effect than that of any other body of individuals.
1 Any doubt
that might arise from Article V of the Constitution would seem to be
resolved by the Tenth Amendment which was subsequent in time and
therefore controls. If all powers not already granted to the Federal
Government are reserved "to the states respectively, or to the people,"
it is they and they alone who can grant new powers, although they
permit Congress to select one of two specified agencies through which
the grant is to be made, i. e., legislatures or conventions. If on the other
hand these bodies, in considering new grants of powers to the Federal
Government, act as agents of the Federal Government, free from state
constitutional restraints, the Tenth Amendment is empty verbiage.
The third contention made in attacking the Nineteenth Amendment
was "that the ratifying resolutions of Tennessee and of West Virginia
are inoperative because adopted in violation of the rules of legislative
procedure preeailing in the respective States."'
2 The court seems to
concede by silence the validity of this objection, and indeed, the case of
-'The people of the United States by their Constitution might have conferred
power upon any body of individuals to adopt an amendment on behalf of the
inhabitants of Tennessee or Missouri. Such power could not shbsequently be
taken away by the people of one state. Did they in fact confer such power?
The action of a state legislature in ratifying an amendment affects the jural
relations of two groups of individuals: the inhabitants of the particular state and
the inhabitants of the other states. It is not unreasonable to suppose that the
power of a legislature to bind the two groups was intended to come from both
groups by separate action. Thus, two parties may contract through a common
agent; but he must have power to bind both in order to bind either, and this
power must be conferred by each acting separately. So, the agency of a legisla-
ture to act on behalf of both the nation and the state may depend upon both
the Federal Constitution and the State Constitution.
'Under the Rules of the Tennessee House a member voting in favor of a
resolution may change his vote and move to reconsider. This has the effect of
suspending the passage of the measure for two parliamentary days or until a
new vote is taken. The vote in favor of the equal suffrage resolution was 5o to
46, but one of those voting affirmatively immediately made a motion to reconsider.
For several days thereafter there was not a quorum, because of a filibuster.
The filibusterers then returned, and with a quorum present the motion to recon-
sider was entertained and the suffrage resolution defeated. Meanwhile, however,
the Governor of the State certified to the Secretary of State of the United States
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Haire v. Rice13 practically forces such a conclusion, 14 if such rules were
actually violated. "But," said the court, "the question raised may have
been rendered immaterial by the fact that since the proclamation the
legislatures of two other states-Connecticut and Vermont-have adopted
resolutions of ratification." A further and broader answer was also
given. "As the legislatures of Tennessee and of West Virginia had
power to adopt the resolutions of ratification, official notice to the Secre-
tary duly authenticated, that they had done so, was conclusive upon him,
and, being certified to by his proclamation, is conclusive upon the
courts."' 5
that Tennessee had ratified, and the latter proclaimed the Nineteenth Amendment a
part of the Constitution.
It has been said that this action of the Tennessee House upon the motion to
reconsider was an attempt to "withdraw" the ratification of the amendment and
was therefore a nullity. This contention is based upon the theory that since
ratification of an amendment is a political and not a legislative act, the ordinary
rules of procedure do not apply. If the ordinary parliamentary rules do apply,
and this is a natural inference from the case of Haire v. Rice, supra note Io,
there was nb attempt to "withdraw" ratification for the obvious reason that there
had been no ratification. The case is therefore essentially different from the
action of Ohio and New Jersey in attempting to rescind their ratifications of the
Fourteenth Amendment and of New York in attempting to rescind its ratification
of the Fifteenth Amendment.
The West Virginia case involved much the same principle. One of the rules
of the West Virginia Senate provides that after a measure is defeated and'a
motion to reconsider lost, it cannot be again considered at that session. The
joint resolution to ratify the suffrage amendment was defeated in the Senate of
that State and a motion to reconsider lost. But upon another vote subsequently
taken in the same session the resolution was passed, the suffrage forces having
been recruited to a sufficient strength by the addition of a senator who made a
trip across the continent from California for the purpose. But see infra note 16
as to whether the rule involved was actually violated under these facts.
"' Supra note io.
" See Dodd, Amending the Constitution (192) 30 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 321, 345.
Mr. Dodd says that the state may "determine what shall be the organization of the
State's representative legislative body, and what shall be the quorum for action
by that body." He does not, however, believe that the state may "impose
limitations upon the power to ratify." This distinction between (I) legislative
organization and procedure, in connection with the ratification of a federal
amendment, and (2) the competence of the state legislature to act upon a federal
amendment, is a clear one. But it is difficult to perceive from Article V any
intention in the people of the states to divest themselves of control over their
legislatures in the one respect any more than in the other. Nor is Hawke v.
Smith authority for such a view, since that case went simply upon the proposi-
tion that a state cannot change the mode of ratification, provided in the Federal
Constitution. That is to say, when Congress designates a state legislature as the
proper agency, the state cannot designate a referendmn. The two questions are
obviously different.
"Citing Field v. Clark (1892) 143 U. S. 649, 669-673, 12 Sup. Ct. 495, 497-499.
Harwood v. Wentworth (1896) 162 U. S. 547, 562, 16 Sup. Ct. 89o, 893. See also,
9 Ann. Cas 583, note; 23 L. R. A. 340, note; 40 L. R. A. (N. s.) I, note. Dodd,
Amending the Constitution (92) 30 YAIE LAW JOURNAL, 321, 324-325. The
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It will be noted that even if the validity of the Tennessee and Missouri
constitutional limitations in controversy were admitted, the Amendment
would still be sustained by counting Connecticut and Vermont instead
of these two states, and by disposing of the objection in the case of West
Virginia as was done or in some other way.' In view of the not unwise
requirement of the Tennessee Constitution, found also in the Florida
Constitution, that the legislature which ratifies shall have been elected
after the proposal of the amendment, thus preventing hasty and ill con-
sidered changes of the organic law of the land which cannot be repealed
save by a further resort to the amending process, the question remains
of considerable interest.
SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS IN EQUITABLE ESTATES
In England a creditor always acquired by assignment all his debtor's
rights, including any rights to payment of income from a trustee.,
Where the latter had no discretion as to the time or mode of payment of
income to A,2 or discretion as to the time or manner, but no alternative
as to the disposal of the income,3 or a discretion to apply the income for
other purposes without a power to exclude A entirely,4 all restraints on
the alienation or anticipation of A's interest were void and his assignee
rule laid down in the cases cited is that the court cannot go behind the enrolled
act and inspect the legislative journals. Both Tennessee and West Virginia
follow the contrary rule. Brewer v. Mayor (1888) 86 Tenn. 732, 9 S. W. i66;
Price v. City of Moundsville (1897) 43 W. Va. 523, 27 S. E. 218. Since, then,
there is no officer in either of these states who has power to make a certificate of
any action by the legislature which shall be conclusive upon the courts, it may be
asked what the court means by "official notice to the Secretary, duly authenti-
cated"? As to whether in considering an act of a state legislature the Supreme
Court will follow the state law in regard to inspection of the journals, cf. South
Ottawa v. Perkins (1876) 94 U. S. 260; Walnut v. Wade (I880) lO3 U. S. 683;
Post v. Supervisors (i881) O5 U. S. 667; Wilkes County v. Coles (19Ol) i8o
U. S. 5o6, 21 Sup. Ct. 458; Peters v. Braward (1912) 222 U. S. 483, 32 Sup. Ct.
122.
" Cf. the disposition made of the West Virginia case by the Court of Appeals
of Maryland, (3921) 114 Atl. 840, 848, holding that the legislative rule (see note
12 supra) providing that a question once determined must stand as the judgment
of the house unless reconsidered within the two succeeding days, has no reference
to a resolution coming from the other house, since the two resolutions originating
in different houses do not constitute one measure. Cushing, Law and Practice
of Legislative Assemblies (9th ed. 1874) 896. This seems to be a perfectly sound
basis for upholding the West Virginia ratification.
'See I Gray, Restraints on Alienation (2d ed. 1895) sec. 167 j. All restraints
on equitable fees in England, and generally in this country, were void. See
ibid. secs. 105-125; Potter v. Couch (i893) 141 U. S. 296, ii Sup. Ct. 1005.
2Brandon v. Robinson (1811, Ch.) I8 Ves. 429.
'Green v. Spicer (183o, Ch.) Taml. 396; Younghusband v. Gisborne (I844,
Ch.) i Coll. 4o0.
'Rippon v. Norton (1839, Ch.) 2 Beav. 63; Kearsley v. Woodcock (1843, Ch.)
3 Hare, 385.
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could claim from the trustee A's entire interest.s  The only means
of keeping A's equitable interest from A's creditors was by a limitation
to A until he should become bankrupt, then over to B,6 which took the
estate away from both A and the creditors and consequently failed to
execute the settlor's or testator's intention to benefit A except in so far
as the dariger of losing the estate tends to compel A to keep within his
income. The one exception to the invalidity of restraints on alienation
was in the case of the separate estates of married women.7  The gen-
eral rule was based 6n the reasoning that at law a power of alienation
is a necessary incident to an estate and that a creditor should have the
benefits of his debtor's property.8 The separate estate of a married
woman was a creature of equity and was protected on grounds of public
policy.9
Spendthrift trusts, however, are now generally recognized in the
United States.10 The number of years for which they may exist and
'See cases supra notes 2 and 3. It seems that after notice the trustees must
account to A's assignee for whatever payments were made to A, the cestui. In
re Coleman (1888, C. A.) L. R. 39 Ch. Div. 443.
See Gray, op. cit. secs. 78-89, dealing with forfeitures for alienation of life
estates.
Ibid. secs. 125-131, 269-277a.
'Ibid. sec. lO5.
'See Baggett v. Meux (1844, Ch.) I Coll. 138, 149; but see Gray, op. cit. sec.
126; Gray, Rule againt Perpetuities (3d ed. 1915) secs. 432-438.
" In the following states the American doctrines of spendthrift trusts seems
to have been adopted in varying forms. Arkansas, Bowlin v. Citizens' Bank &
Trust Co. (1917) 131 Ark. 97, 198 S. W. 288; California, McColgan v. Magee
(1916) 172 Calif. 182, 155 Pac. 995; Connecticut, Mason v. Rhode Island Hospital
Trust Co. (1905) 78 Conn. 8r, 61 Ati. 57; Washington, D. C., King v. Shelton
(91o) 36 App. D. C. i; Georgia, Barnett v. Montgomery (1887) 79 Ga. 726, 4
S. E. 874; Illinois, O'Hare v. Johnston (1916) 273 Il. 458, 113 N. E. 127; Iowa,
Kiffner v. Kiffner (igig) 185 Iowa, lO64, 171 N. W. 590; Kansas, Everitt v.
Haskins (1918) 1O2 Kan. 546, 171 Pac. 632; Maine, Roberts v. Stevens (1892)
84 Me. 325, 24 AtI. 873; Maryland, Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore v.
Independent Brewing Assoc. (1916) 127 Md. 463, 96 Atl. 617; Massachusetts,
Morel v. Cornell (1920) 234 Mass. 563, 125 N. E. 575; Mississippi, Mitchell v.
Choctaw Bank (1914) 107 Miss. 314, 65 So. 278; Missouri, Kerens v. St. Louis
Union Trust Co. (1920) 283 Mo. 6oi, 223 S. W. 645; Nebraska, Weller v.
Noffsinger (1899) 57 Neb. 455, 77 N. W. o75; North Carolina, Fowler & Lee
v. Webster (1917) 173 N. C. 442, 92 S. E. 157; New Hampshire, Parker v.
Carpenter (19,5) 77 N. H. 453, 92 AtI. 955; New Jersey, Castree v. Shotwell
(i9o8) 73 N. J. .Eq. 590, 68 AtI. 774; New York, In re Armstrong's Will (192o)
190 App. Div. 829, 181 N. Y. Supp. 442; Oregon, Mattison v. Mattison (igog) 53
Or. 254, IOO Pac. 4; Pennsylvania, In re Hall's Estate (1915) 248 Pa. 218, 93 AtI.
944; Tennessee, Vines v. Vines (1921, Tenn.) 226 S. W. 1O39; Texas, Hoffman
v. Rose (1919, Civ. App.) 217 S. W. 424; West Virginia, McCreery v. Johnston
(1922, W. Va.) Iio S. E. 464.
The following states have definitely followed the English rule. Kentucky,
Louisville Tobacco Warehouse Co. v. Thompson (1916) 172 Ky. 350, 189 S. W.
245; Rhode Island, Stone v. Westcott (1894) i8 R. I. 685, 29 AtI. 838; Virginia,
Hutchinson v. Maxwell (1902) IOO Va. 169, 4o S. E. 655.
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the amounts which may be so restricted vary considerably. In many
states these matters are controlled by statute.:1 A power of alienation
is not considered as a necessary incident to an estate, and it is said that
one should be able to protect and provide for an incompetent dependent
or relative who otherwise might be a burden on the state.12 The rule
should not be extended too far and it is universally held that a person
cannot settle such a trust on himself.38 The nature of the cestumi's
interest is rather anomalous. The courts following the English rule
hold that he has no interest whatever.' 4 Some courts, that adopt the
American rule, have also said that he has no interest 5 ; it is submitted,
however, that the cestui could, in the case of refusal by the trustees,
have forced them at least to pay for his support and maintenance.
Other courts have held that he takes a vested interest, a qualified right
or an absolute right, depending on how much discretion is in the trus-
tees.'" Under the American doctrine the cestui should be held to take
a vested interest, the minimum of which is a right to support and main-
tenance 7 and increasing, according to the discretion vested in the
trustees by the trust deed to an absolute right to a definite sum at defin-
ite periods' where such is provided for by the terms of the trust deed.
The following states seem to recognize spendthrift trusts but no authorities
have been found exactly determining the question. Arizona, Rev. Sts. 1913, sec.
1224; Florida, Croont v. Ocala Plumbing & Electric Co. (1911) 62 FIa. 460, 57
So. 243; Indiana, Reeder v. Antrim (1915) 64 Ind. App. 83, Iio N. E. 568;
Burn's Ann. Sts. 1914, secs. 3998, 9723; Minnesota, Gen. Sts. 1913, secs. 6664,
6686-8; Vermont, Wales v. Bowdsh (1888) 61 Vt 23, 17 Atl. looO; Wisconsin,
Manegan v. Shea (914) 158 Wis. 61g, i4o N. W. 378.
'Calif. Civ. Code, sec. 867; Conn. Gen. Sts. 1918, secs. 5872-3; see Carter v.
Brownell (i92O) 95 Conn. 216, I1 At. 182; Ga. Code, 1911, sec. 3729; Carroll's
Ky. Sts. 1915, sec. 2355; N. C. Rev. Sts. 19o5, sec. 1588; N. Y. Cons. Laws, 19o9,
Real Prop. Law, ch. 41, sec. 15, ch. 50 sees. 98, 1O3. For a further collection of
statutes, see Gray, Restraints on Alienation, sec. 26; (1920) 30 YALE LAw
JOuRNAL, 202; 3 Tiffany, Real Property (192o ed.) 2319.
"See Nichols v. Eaton (1875) 91 U. S. 716, 725-727.
"McColgan v. Magee, supra note IO; .Brown v. McGill (1898) 87 Md. .161, 39
Atl. 613; Jamison v. Mississippi Valley Trust Co. (1918, Mo.) 2o7 S. W. 788;
Ghornley v. Smith (i8gi) 139 Pa. 584, 21 Atl. 135.
"'Louisville Tobacco Warehouse Co. v. Thompson, supra note io."'See Kerens v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., supra note io; Fowler & Lee v.
Webster, supra note io. In each of these cases it was said that the cestui took
no interest, but the question was whether a creditor or an assignee of the cestui
could reach it. The court did not go so far as to say that the trustee could cut
off the cestui entirely. See also Parker v. Carpenter, supra note io. For a
discussion of what a trustee with absolute discretion may do under the English
rule, see in re Colemans, upra note 5.
"Vested right. See Morel v. Cornell, supra note io; Nunn v. Titche (1917,
Tex. Civ. App.) 196 S. W. 89o, 892; O'Hare v. Johnson, supra note lO. Qualified
vested right. Kiffner v. Kiffner, supra note io (case of a legacy to be paid over
as trustee saw fit). See 1 Tiffany, op. cit. 6o9.
'.See Parker v. Carpenter, supra note Io.
" Lindsey v. Rose (1915, Tex. Civ. App.) 175 S. W. 829.
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Can these restraints against alienation and freedom from the claims of
creditors, usually provided for by the spendthrift trust, be imposed on an
equitable fee? Most courts, apparently, have permitted such restraints
to be attached only to a life estate.1 9 The recent case of McCreery v.
Johnston (1922, W. Va.) iio S. E. 464 is typical. The cestui was
held to take an equitable fee 'free of any limitations and conditions.
Several jurisdictions have held the contrary and have allowed the
restraint to attach to a fee at least for the life of the first
taker.2 0  It has been suggested that such a rule will operate to tie up
property indefinitely and forever; that once admitted there is no way
of ending the restraint.2' For example, if A takes a fee subject to
restraints against alienation, A may convey it by devise or through
inheritance to his descendants subject to the same restraints. This is
obviously absurd and does not necessarily follow. Except in those
jurisdictions where the interest of the cestui is not vested, the rule
against perpetuities does not help as it applies only to the vesting of
estates.2   But there are several analogies. Normally, a trust- is ended
when the active duties of the trustee are finished and all the equitable
interest in the hands of one or several cestuis. Then the cestui or
cestuis can obtain a conveyance from the trustee of all of their share
of the corpus ofthe estate.23 Yet the postponement of the conveyance
of the legal title is permitted in some states.24  But this postponement,
it seems, must be limited to lives in being or to lives in being and
twenty-one years thereafter, 25 a period analogous to that set by the rule
against perpetuities. Whether or not a cestui having such a vested
interest can assign it subject to the postponement has not been -deter-
mined.2 8  In the case of married women, the restraints permitted on
"See Gray, Restraints on Alienation, secs. 113-116.
'Haskell v. Haskell (920) 234 Mass. 442, 125 N. E. 6O; Boston Safe Deposit
Co. v. Collier (1915) 222 Mass. 390, III N. E. 163; Beck's Estate (i8go) 133 Pa.
51, 19 Atl. 302; Weller v. Noffsinger, supra note IO; Hopkinson v. Swaim (1918)
284 Ill. ii, 119 N. E. 985; see Kiffner v. Kiffuer, supra note io.
"See Kales, Future Interests (2d ed. 1920) sec. 741.
See Gray, Rule Against Perpetuities, sec. 205.
'See i Tiffany, op. cit. sec. 116.
"Claflin v. Claflin (1889) 149 Mass. 19, 20 N. E. 454; Sheley v. Sheley (1916)
272 Ill. 95, III N. E. 591; Avery v. Avery (189o) go Ky. 613, 14 S. W. 593;
Kiffner v. Kiffner, supra note io; -It re Hall's Estate, supra note io; Weller v.
Noffsinger, supra note io; De Ladson v. Crawford (1919) 93 Conn. 402, io6
At. 326.
"See Kales, op. cit. sec. 737; Gray, Restraints on Alienation, sec. 272 c, d;
Winsor v. Mills (1892) 157 Mass. 362, 32 N. E. 352; Gray, Rule Against Perpetui-
ties, ch. 4. For a discussion of the doctrine of Claflin v. Claflin, supra note 24,
see Kales, op. cit. secs. 732-738.
" If the cestui is permitted to assign, can his assignee obtain immediate con-
veyance of the corpus of the gift from the trustee? Clafin v. Clafin, supra note
24, did not settle this. The reason for sustaining the postponement, namely to
allow the testator to dispose of his bounty as he thinks best- for a particular
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legal and equitable fees have always been limited to the period of cov-
erture.2 7  Logically, ;ind on these analogies, the same limiting period
should exist for spendthrift trusts on equitable fees. If this is the
result, at most the effect is to extend the operation of the restraint
twenty-one years. If the interest is future, a difficult question arises
as to when the period should begin to run.
2 8
The instant case seems to apply the better rule; but if a definite limit
is set to the period of restraint, it is difficult to see much difference
between permitting a spendthrift trust on a life estate or on a fee.
29
JUDICIAL DISCRETION AND RULES OF COURT
In an endeavor to banish forever the rigor and technicalities of the
common-law regulations of pleading and practice, the State of New
York adopted in 1848 the Field Code, a brief set of rules comprising less
than four hundred sections, which were intended to cover every phase
of court business. Failing to attain this necessarily impossible object,
the original code was amended by successive legislatures until its size
increased ten-fold, and its difficulties correspondingly. Many other
states followed New York's lead, using the Field Code as a basis upon
which to model their own, and with similar unsatisfactory results.
Coincident with the failure of the code system, legal societies and
writers, recognizing the need for a system that would provide a just and
speedy decision upon the merits with procedure playing a minor role,
have been advocating the freedom of the court from legislative interfer-
ence;' the simplest plan being that of the American Bar Association,
which provides for revesting the control of procedure in the courts, the
control to be exercised, however, by rules formally promulgated rather
than by regulations evolved through judicial decision. Some states
have already adopted such a system, 2 and it is probably only a question
of time before many more will follow.
person, fails as between a stranger and the trustee. But if termination of the
trust is permitted, then the cestui can easily avoid the postponement by assigning
his interest to a third person. At least one case seemed to recognize the power
of the cestui to transfer the interest, and yet upheld a postponement clause of
ten years against the assignee. De Ladson v. Crawford, supra note 24. The
cestui's interest however does not pass to an assignee in bankruptcy. Boston Safe
Deposit Co. v. Collier, supra note 2o; see (1916) 29 HARV. L. REv. 557; L. R. A.
1917, A, g8g, note.
See Gray, Restraints on Alienation, secs. 125, 140.
See Gray, Rule Against Perpetuities, sec. 442.
See Hopkinson v. Swaim, supra note 20.
'E. M. Morgan, Judicial Regulation of Court Procedure (1918) 2 MINN. L. Rlv.
81, and articles there cited; see also Elihu Root, Hampering the Court by Legis-
lation (1919) 5 A. B. A. JouR. 676.
'Among these states are New Jersey (Acts, 1912, ch. 231, sec. 32) ; Colorado
(Laws, 1913, ch. 121); Alabama (Laws, 1915, p. 6o7); Michigan (Pub. Acts,
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The two great and obvious benefits that can be expected from the
adoption of the American Bar Association's proposals are: first, that
better rules will result; and, second, that the system will be less rigid
and more adaptable to the varying requirements of justice. The latter
object is the more difficult of attainment; and in this connection it is
well to consider what has been in the past the attitude of the courts
toward their own rules.
Whether a court may use its discretion in the application of its rules
is a question not free from conflicting opinion. It is said that the con-
flict is more apparent than real, and that the answer actually depends
upon whether the particular rule is mandatory or directory.3 In order
to determine which it is, we are told that the rule should be construed
in the same manner as a statute is construed. It should receive a
rational, sensible interpretation, one which tends to avoid the mischief
at which it was leveled. 4 The application of this criterion, in its most
liberal sense, should result in a reasonably flexible procedure. But other
courts are inclined to be governed by words rather than by spirit, and
to hold that a rule must be strictly enforced if its wording is absolute,
explicit, and peremptory.'
Some limitation upon judicial discretion, especially in the lower courts,
may be advisable for practical reasons. There should be much less room
for the exercise of judicial discretion in applying a rule that is necessary
to secure a fair hearing6 than in the case of one intended solely for the
convenient regulation of court business.7 The dividing line, however, is
a tenuous one, and decisions which it is hard to reconcile on principle
fall on either side of it." In some jurisdictions, the discretionary power
is wholly denied except in those cases where non-compliance with a rule
was due to mistake or accident. In certain cases, it is clear that there
should be no discretion whatsoever, namely, where the rules are designed
to promote a public policy, e. g., to prevent collusion in divorce cases,1°
or to insure the proper qualification of candidates for admission to
the bar. 1
1915, no. 314, sec. 14; Judicature Act, 1915, p.'5) ; Vermont (Laws, I915, no. 90,
sec. io) ; and Virginia (Acts, 1916, p. 939).
3 I5 C. J. 9II; 18 Enc. P1. & Pr. 1267.
'Carlile v. National Oil Co. (192I, Okla.) 2oi Pac. 377, 391.
'Witzler v. Collins (1879) 70 Me. 29o.
'Axtell v. Pulsifer (1895) 155 II1. 141, 39 N. E. 615; Holbert v. Patrick (1918,
Okla.) 176 Pac. 903.
" O'Gara v. Hancock (1918) 76 Fla. I, 79 So. 167; Wilson v. Peacock (1916)
ii Miss. 116, 71 So. 296; Connell v. Higgins (1915) 170 Calif. 541, 150 Pac. 769;
Sanborn v. Boston & M. Ry. (1911) 76 N. H. 65, 79 Atl. 642; Sylvester v. Olson
(1911) 63 Wash. 285, 115 Pac. 175.
'Rio Grande Irrigaiion. Co. v., Gildersleeve (1899) 174 U. S. 603, 19 Sup. Ct.
761; United States v. Breitling (1857, U. S.) 2o How. 25g.
'Chicago, etc. Ry. v. Priddy (1915, Ind. App.) io8 N. E. 238.
"Boyer v. Boyer (19o8) 129 App. Div. 647, 114 N. Y. Supp. 15.
'In re Moore (1888) io8 N. Y. 28o, 15 N. E. 369.
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Rules promulgated by a superior court under statutory authority for
the guidance of lower courts are generally held to have the force and
effect of statutes and to require strict observance.'
2 This is necessary
for proper discipline and for uniformity. It is a simple matter to amend
such rules if they are found to operate harshly.
Whatever the character of the rule, it should certainly be open to the
parties to agree, with the consent of the court
13 of course, to waive its
requirements in order that the merits of the cause may be more rapidly
and conveniently adjudicated.14 There is no one to complain of the non-
observance. However, the recent case of Presho State Bank v. North-
western Milling Co. (1922, S. D.) 186 N. W. 56o, involving rules
adopted by the Supreme Court under statutory authority
15 for the guid-
ance of lower courts, holds otherwise, giving the questionable reason that
it might prove embarrassing to an attorney who did not wish to consent
to a suspension desired by the court.
Court rules are merely a means to an end, and not an end in them-
selves.' This decision illustrates how important it is that this be kept
in mind when the rules are framed. For if they do not permit a discre-
tionary enforcement in all proper cases, they will prove, even under the
proposed new system, too rigid to accomplish, in whole, the objects
desired.
PRIVILEGED DEFAMATION
When the newspapers attempted, to aid the Government in arresting
war slackers, by publishing lists of names supplied .by the War Depart-
ment, the probability of their action raising an entirely new phase of
the law of privileged defamation was perhaps never considered. The
"official" character of all news in war time so colored our concept of
private rights that to balance them with the obvious necessity of victory
was little considered. The New York World, at the request of the
War Department, published the name of a supposed slacker. In an
action for libel on the falsity of the statement, the defendant demurred
to his complaint upon the theory that the publication was absolutely
privileged. The court overruled the demurrer, holding that whatever
might be the privileges of the War Department, such privilege did not
extend to the defendant newspaper. Hyman v. Press Pub. Co. (1922)
199 App. Div. 6o9, 192 N. Y. Supp. 47.
The first question is that of absolute privilege. In the past it has
been narrowly restricted, and has included only the proceedings of leg-
" reeling v. Kight (915) 49 Okla. 2o2, 152 Pac. 362; Chester Traction Co. v.
Philadelphia, etc. Ry. (1897) i8o Pa. 432, 36 AtI. 916.
" Missouri, etc. Ry. v. Kidd (i9o6, C. C. A. 8th) 146 Fed. 499.
"4Allen v. Mayor of New York (188o, S. D. N. Y.) 7 Fed. 483; Dwilell v.
Larrabee (1853) 38 Me. 464.
'S. D. Rev. Code, 1919, sec. 5134.
'Magill's Appeal (1868) 59 Pa. 430.
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islative or judicial bodies and acts done in the exercise of military or
naval authority.1 For the sake of the public good it is essential that the
utmost freedom be permitted in certain cases-a judge should not be
hampered by fear of litigation when he is administering the laws of the
country, 2 and the legislator should be permitted fearlessly to support
the interests of his constituency. In other fields, however, the public
welfare does not require so great a sacrifice of the individual and it does
not seem necessary to extend this privilege to the instant case.3
There are circumstances where one making a defamatory statement
may not be absolutely privileged, but may have, nevertheless, the pro-
tection of a qualified or conditional privilege,4 denied only if the plain-
tiff establishes that the communication was actuated by malice.5 In the
instant case the court did not say whether or not such a privilege
existed, but permitted the defendant to withdraw his demurrer and file
an answer. If this privilege exists, it will be necessary for the plaintiff
to prove malice in the defendant before a recovery will be allowed.6
In the past this privilege has been confined to cases in which the
defendant was under the duty, either legal or social, of making the
communication, or in which the statement was in protection of private
interests, or to the reports of proceedings in the courts and the legisla-
ture.7 Although the instant case does not fall definitely under any one
1Mundy v. Hoard (1921, Mich.) 185 N. W. 872; Koehler v. Dubose (1918, Tex.
Civ. App.) 200 S. W. 238; Hasrsett v. Carroll (I91I) 85 Conn. 23, 8I At. 1013.
'A judge is not liable for false statements made in judicial proceedings, even
if made maliciously. Mundy v. McDonald (1921, Mich.) 185 N. W. 877.
'Newell, Slander and Libel (3d ed. 1914) 5o8.
'A privileged communication in the law of libel and slander is a defamatory
communication made on an occasion of privilege without actual malice. Ely v.
Mason (1921, Conn.) 115 At. 479.
'If express malice be found, it destroys the conditional privilege that would
otherwise exist. Gerlach v. Gruett (1921, Wis.) 185 N. W. 195; Andrews v.
Gardiner (1915) 168 App. Div. 629, 154 N. Y. Supp. 486. Questions of malice
and good faith are immaterial if the privilege is absolute. Bolton v. Walker
(1917) 197 Mich. 699, 164 N. W. 42o. Malice, as used in connection with priv-
ileged communications, does not necessarily import hatred, ill-will, anger, wrath,
or vindictiveness, but need be no more than the antithesis of good faith. Cobb
v. Garlington (1917, Tex. Civ. App.) 193 S. W. 463. It may be established by
showing that the defendant was actuated by an unjustifiable motive: Gray v.
Mossan= (1914) 88 Conn. 247, 9o At. 938; or that he had shown a wanton
inclination to mischief, an intention to injure or wrong, or a depraved inclination
to disregard the rights of others: Morasca v. Item Co. (IgIo) 126 La. 426, 52
So. 565.
'Lack of malice will prevent a recovery. Conklin v. Augusta Chronicle Pub..
Co. (1921, C. C. A. 5th) 276 Fed. 288; Hansen v. Hansen (1914) 126 Minn. 426,
148 N. W. 457. In a case involving qualified privilege, the burden of proving
malice is on the one defamed. Newell, op. cit. 479.
"A fair and accurate report may be made of a judicial proceeding either by
repeating it literally and completely, or by giving a more or less condensed
summary. Age-Herald Pub. Co. v. Waterman (1919, Ala.) 81 So. 621. Such
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of these headings, it seems advisable to extend to it this qualified priv-
ilege. The doctrine of privileged communcations rests in public
policy." The instant case represents the publication of a report of an
official branch of the Government, made for the purpose of bringing a
criminal to justiceY The extent of the publication is reasonable for the
purpose in view,"0 and consequently it cannot be said that the privilege
a report is a privileged communication. Conklin v. Augusta Chronicle Pub. Co.,
supra note 6. An impartial account of legislative or executive proceedings is
privileged. People's United States Bank v. Goodwin (19io) 148 Mo. App. 364,
128 S. W. 220. But a publication charging a member of the legislature with
corruption is not. Littlejohn v. Greeley (1861, N. Y.) 13 Abb. Prac. 41. The
publication of the reports of police officers to their superiors is not privileged:
Billett v. Times-Democrat Pub. Co. (igoi) 1O7 La. 751, 32 So. 17; nor the publi-
cation of pleadings and preliminary papers: Finnegan v. Eagle Printing Co.
(1920) 173 Wis. 5, 179 N. W. 788. The return of indictments by a grand jury
is a judicial proceeding, and reports thereof are privileged. Sweet v. Post Pub.
Co. (1913) 215 Mass. 450, 1O2 N. E. 66o. So, also, proceedings before a magis-
trate, although no record of them is preserved. Flues v. New Nonpariel Co.
(1912) 155 Iowa, 29o, 135 N. W. 1O83; Bresslin v. Sunt Printing and Pub.
Association (1917) 177 App. Div. 92, 163 N. Y. Supp. 915. Where a judicial
tribunal proceeds without jurisdiction, its acts are extra-judicial, and a report
of the proceedings is not privileged. See Parsons v. Age-Herald Pub. Co. (1913)
181 Ala. 439, 61 So. 345. If the court has jurisdiction of the subject matter, it is
immaterial that it has no jurisdiction of the person of the party. Lee v.
Brooklyn Union Pub. Co. (1913) 209 N. Y. 245, 103 N. E. 155. This privilege
is also extended to executive and legislative proceedings and investigations.
Brown v. Globe Printing Co. (1908) 213 Mo. 611, 112 S. W. 462. It is well
settled that newspapers have no greater privilege of giving currency to libellous
charges than have other persons. Lundin v. Post Pub. Co. (1914) 217 Mass.
213, 104 N. E. 480; Elms v. Crane (1919) 118 Me. 261, 1o7 Atl. 852. "Liberty
of the press" merely means that newspaper publications shall not be subject to
censorship. Williams Printing Co. v. Saunders (1912) 113 Va. 156, 73 S. E. 472.
For a discussion of the right to enjoin a libel, see Pound, Equitable Relief against
Defamation and Injuries to Personality (1916) 29 HARv. L. REv. 640, 642.
"Alexander v. Vann (192o) 18o N. C. 187, 1O4 S. E. 36o; Newell, op. cit. 477.
Publicity of official records is consistent with public policy. Belo v. Lacy (i9o8,
Tex. Civ. App.) III S. W. 215.
' Communications otherwise slanderous are privileged, if made in good faith
to an officer engaged in hunting a prisoner. Beshiers v. Allen (1915) 46 Okla.
331, 148 Pac. 141; Eames v. Whitaker (1877) 123 Mass. 342; Elns v. Crane,
supra note 7. It is no defence, however, if the communication was published
merely as news. Heyler v. N. Y. News Pub. Co. (1893) 71 Hun, 4, 24 N. Y.
Supp. 499.
10 The unnecessary transmission by telegram of libellous matter, which would
have been privileged if sent in a sealed letter, avoids the privilege. Williamson
v. Freer (1874) L. R. 9 C. P. 393. The mere fact of sending a defamatory com-
munication on a post-card, made in circumstances which render the occasion privi-
leged betveen the writer and the recipient, does not avoid the privilege if the
communication contains no reference to the person defamed which is intelligible
to third parties. Sadgrave v. Hole [1901] 2 K. B. I. In regard to the advisability
of extending to the telegraph company the privilege of the sender, see Smith,
Liability of a Telegraph Company for Transmitting a Defamatory Message
(192o) :2o Co. L. REv. 369.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
was exceeded. While it is always dangerous to allow public excite-
ment" to influence the courts, it is probably for the best interests of
the community that there should be published broadcast 12 the names of
those men who so successfully gained the contempt of their fellow citi-
zens, even if mistakes are inevitable.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-INJURIES CAUSED SOLELY BY DISEASE
Does an injury caused solely by a predisposed condition of the
employee, such as dizziness, epilepsy, intoxication, weakness, etc., arise
"out of" the employment within the meaning of the workmen's com-
pensation acts? This problem was considered by the Connecticut
Supreme Court of Errors in the recent case of Gonier v. Chase Com-
panies, Inc. (1921) 97 Conn. 46, 115 Atl. 677, where it was held that
the widow of a painter who sustained fatal injuries by falling from
the staging on which he was at work was entitled to compensation, even
though he fell because of unconsciousness caused by an attack of indi-
gestion such as he was accustomed to have. The evidence showed that
the deceased knew of his ailment and had been- warned by his physician
not to work as a painter. The court found that the conditions of the
employment contributed to the injury,' but expressly followed the Eng-
lish case of Wicks v. Dowell2 which held that the fall and not the fit was
the proximate cause of an injury sustained by a workman who fell
when seized with a fit. This decision, however, apparently has been
restricted by subsequent English cases 3 to its peculiar facts and has not
been accepted as establishing the proposition that an injury caused
' During the war a member of a Liberty Loan committee distributed circulars
prepared by the county council of defence, containing libellous statements about
the plaintiff because of his refusal to subscribe. These statements were held to be
privileged in a "limited" sense. McBroom v. Weir (I92o, Tex. Civ. App.) 219
S. W. 855.
It is unnecessary to point out that newspapers will refuse to publish these
lists in the future if it is decided that there exists no privilege. By statute in
England such a publication as that involved in the instant case is given the pro-
tection of a qualified privilege. Law of Libel Amendment Act (1888) 51 & 52
Vict, c. 64. sec. 4. See (1922) 22 COL. L. REv. 374.
'See Reeves v. Dady Corp. (1921) 95 Conn. 627, 113 Atl. 162. The employee
was engaged as foreman in the defendant's silk mill located on the second story
of a factory. A fellow employee's account of the details of an operation caused
him to become faint. He walked to an open doorway which was protected only
by a bar three feet from the floor. His knees gave way and he fell to the pave-
ment below. Held, that the accident arose "in the course of," but not "out of,"
the employment.
2 [19o5, C. A.] 2 K. B. 225. The employee's duty was to stand on a wooden
stage near the edge of a hatchway and regulate the descent of a bucket which was
being used in the unloading of coal from the hold of a vessel. While thus
engaged he was seized with an epileptic fit and fell into the hold.
'Nash v. Rangatira [1914, C. A.] 3 K. B. 978; Frith v. The LouLrianian [1912,
C. A.] 2 K. B. 155; Butler v. Burton-on-Trent Union (1912, C. A.) io6 L. T. R.
824. The employee was seized with a fit of coughing and fell down a flight of
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solely by the temporary illness of the employee arises "out of" the
employment within the contemplation of the compensation statutes.
The language of the court4 has been interpreted as limiting the rule
to cases where the place of labor is "unusually dangerous."
5
Several American jurisdictions have had an opportunity to follow the
rule applied in the Wicks case, but have refused to do so on the ground
that in cases of this character the real and efficient cause of the injury is
the condition which the employee brings with him to his work. The
effects of the disease are considered the sole cause of the injury and a
recovery has been allowed only where they were induced or aggra-
vated by the incidents or character of the employment.6 This view
was adopted in a recent New York case and compensation denied where
the fall and injury were caused solely by the unconsciousness of the
employee.7  The rule laid down in the case of Wicks v. McDowell,
however, has been followed in Illinois without qualification.
s No diffi-
culty arises where the nature or incidents of the employment contribute
to, or accelerate, the abnormal condition of the workman; he is
allowed compensation for the entire consequences.9 The Wicks case
stone stairs. No recovery was allowed. Cozens-Hardy, M. R., said in part:
"There was nothing peculiar to his employment which rendered the risk of this
accident happening greater than that to which other people are exposed. It is
not as if he was engaged in any task which was likely to render his coughing
more dangerous or more frequent."
'In Wicks v. Dowell, supra note 2, Collins, M. R., at p. 229, said: "How does
it come about in the present case that the accident arose out of the employment?
Because by the conditions of his employment the workman was bound to stand
on the edge of what ]r may style a precipice and, if in that position he was seized
with a fit he would almost necessarily fall over."
'Rodger v. Paisley School Board (1912, Ct. of Sess.) 49 Scot. L. R. 413, 5
Butt. W. Comp. Cas. 547. In Wright & Greig, Ltd. v. McKendry (1918, Ct. of
Sess.) 56 Scot L. R. 39, 12 Butt W. Comp. Cas. 41o, a recovery was allowed
where the workman had a fit and fell on the concrete floor of a distillery in
which he was employed. The court expressly approved of the Wicks case on the
ground that because of his employment the workman was brought within a zone
of special danger. Lord Salvesen, however, dissenting, used this language: "It
is said that the fall was the accident and that this was the proximate cause of the
injury, and that it is unnecessary and irrelevant to inquire further. I humbly
think that if this were enough the words 'arising out of the employment' might
as well be erased from the act." Thorn or Simpson v. Sinclair [1917, H. L.] A.
C. 127, io Butt. W. Comp. Cas. =o, is a case where the employee was, by the
nature and condition of his employment, brought into a zone of danger.
'Cox v. Kansas City Refining (1921) io8 Kan. 320, 195 Pac. 863; Eastman Co.
v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1921, Calif.) 20o Pac. 17; Van Gorder v. Packard
Motor Car Co. (1917) 195 Mich. 588, 162 N. W. 1O7; Brooker v. Industrial Acc.
Corn. (1917) 176 Calif. 275, 168 Pac. 126.
'Joseph v. United Kimona Co. (1921) 194 App. Div. 568, 185 N. Y. Supp. 700.
8 Peoria Ry. Terminal Co. v. Industrial Board (1917) 279 Ill. 352, 116 N. E.
651; Vulcan Detinning Co. v. Industrial Corn. (1920) 295 Il. 41, 128 N. E. 917.
'Carroll v. What Cheer Stables Co. (1916) 38 R . I421, 96 Atl. 2o8; In re
Madden (1916) = Mass. 487, il1 N. E. 379.
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and the cases following it are based upon the theory that workmen's
compensation is compulsory social insurance and that the word "acci-
dent" should be interpreted as broadly under these circumstances as it
is in the law of insurance. But, on the other hand, is not an accident,
caused solely by disease, merely one of the perils of life itself-com-
mon to humanity and independent of status-and can it be attributed in
any way to the employment of the afflicted individual? The final solu-
tion of the problem depends upon whether the legislature intended that
all employees within the limits of employment should thereby become
automatically insured.
As pointed out in a recent comment,1 it is the practice in the majority
of American jurisdictions to allow an examination of jurors prior to
challenge, and that this practice is not permitted in England. In a
recent Ontario case2 tried before the Hon. Mr. Justice Riddell the
conversation between court and counsel during the calling of the jury,
indicated that the English practice of denying an opportunity to examine
a juror prior to challenge is adhered to in the Province of Ontario.
'COMMENTS (1922) 31 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 514.2 Rex. v. Harri (Feb. ioth, 1922) Sup. Ct. Ont.
"Mr. Glass: 'I would like to question the juryman.'
"His Lordship: 'No you cannot question him, you can challenge for cause, and
the matter will then be tried, but you cannot question the juryman. We have no
such system as obtains in some of the American courts.
"'I give a formal ruling on the point so that it may be of record.
"'Counsel for the prisoner desiring to question a juryman before he was sworn,
I rule that that is not permissible in our practice. This was decided, so far as I
know, only once in this Province-in I833-by Chief Justice Robinson of. the
Court of King's Bench of Upper Canada, upon the trial (at Brockville for murder
in a duel) of John Wilson, who was afterwards a Judge of the Court of Common
Pleas. (35 Can. Law Times, September 1915, pp. 726, et seq.) We have never
introduced into this Province the practice which seems to be common in the
United States: we have followed the English practice. R. v. Peter Cook, 13 St.
Tr. 334; R. v. Ednonds, (1821) 4 B. & Ald. 471, 492.
"'According to our practice there are two kinds of individual challenge: the
peremptory challenge and the challenge for cause. The peremptory challenge can
be exercised at the proper time to an extent mentioned in the Code. In a challenge
for cause, the cause must be stated-Code, ss. 935, 936--and there is a regular way
of trial of the cause, to determine whether the juryman is or is not to serve.
"'I make that ruling now so that it may be borne in mind. Very many, partic-
ularly of the younger barristers, seem to imagine that we have introduced what
is to me an exceedingly objectionable practice. I may say that I have seen the
questioning of a juryman only once in our Courts: that was at the Assizes at
Ottawa before the late Mr. Justice Robertson, upon the trial of a woman for
cruelty to her children, in which I was of counsel for the Crown, and Mr. Fripp
was counsel for the prisoner. I did not, on behalf of the Crown, object to it
being done although I stated that it was not regular. In that particular instance
it was allowed; but I think the practice should not be permitted to spread.'"
